8.3.1 Assessment of Security Sub-Criterion

Publication Date:

1 April 2009

In the Part 1 Appraisal, practitioners have considered whether the option under consideration has any material impact on security for the users. Where impacts have been identified, to complete the security sub-criterion in the Part 2 AST, it is recommended that the methodology and approach applied is consistent with that set out below. A key set of security indicators for public transport passengers, roads, and walking and cycling are illustrated in Tables 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 respectively. This set is not exhaustive, but it is anticipated that it will be sufficient for most schemes; however, practitioners may wish to consider including other indicators they feel are relevant for the options they are appraising.

Where appropriate, consideration should be given to the security impacts of an option. Options may impact on a range of users including but not limited to equestrians as well those shown here. The security sub-criterion should also consider the impacts of options on particularly vulnerable sections of the community such as children, the elderly or women travelling alone.

Table 8.1: Security Indicators for Public Transport Passengers

Security Indicator	Poor	Moderate	High
Site perimeters, entrances and exits	Unmarked or poorly marked site perimeters, exits etc. Use of solid walls or similar.	Attention to boundary and exit marking, but otherwise unfavourable use of materials.	Clearly marked site perimeters/exits. Use of open fencing rather than solid walls.
Formal surveillance	No CCTV system in place. Design discourages staff surveillance and isolates passengers.	CCTV system in place, but number, location of system not optimal. Poor design which discourages staff surveillance.	Effective CCTV system in place. Design to encourage staff surveillance and group passengers.
Informal surveillance	Poor use of materials (fencing etc) and design. Poor visibility from site surrounds. Very isolated from retailers or other human activity.	Unfavourable use of materials (fencing etc) but reasonable proximity of retailers or other activity.	Positive use of materials (fencing etc) and design to encourage open visibility from site surrounds. Encouragement or proximity of retailers or other activity.
Landscaping	Landscaping features (design, plants etc) inhibits visibility and encourages intruders.	Evidence of some positive use of landscaping features (design, plants etc), but more measures needed to contribute to visibility and deter intruders.	Positive use of landscaping features (design, plants etc) to contribute to visibility and deter intruders.
Lighting and visibility	Poor design including recesses, pillars, obstructions etc which hinder camera/monitor view. Poor or no lighting in passenger areas at night when facility open. No or poor lighting on any signing, information or help points.	Design includes some recesses but not problematical to camera/monitor view. Lighting in passenger areas at some, but not all times when facility open. Lighting not to daylight standard. Attention to lighting on signing, information and help points.	Good design to avoid recesses and facilitate camera/monitor view. Lighting to daylight standard in passenger areas when facility open. Attention to lighting on signing, information and help points.
Emergency call	No or very poor provision of emergency phones, help points and public telephones. Little provision or information on emergency help procedures.	Basic provision of emergency phones, help points and public telephones. Improvements to these and on emergency help procedures needed.	Good provision of emergency phones, help points, public telephones and information on emergency help procedure

Source: DETR Mobility Unit (1998b)

Table 8.2: Security Indicators for Roads

Security Indicator	Relevant Locations	Poor	Moderate	High
Formal surveillance	Service areas, car parks, some roads	No CCTV system. Presence of security staff not apparent.	CCTV system in place but number, location not optimal. Passive system monitoring by staff.	Effective CCTV system in place, used for active real-time monitoring.
Informal surveillance	Service areas, car parks	Poor design that hinders observation of public areas by staff.	Neutral characteristics	Design features facilitate staff monitoring.
Landscaping	Service areas, lay-bys	Landscaping features (slopes, trees etc.) inhibit visibility. For lay-bys, not visible from road.	Generally good, but with a small number of features that conceal areas	Clear sight lines exist to all areas. No concealed areas. For lay-bys, clearly visible from a distance.
Lighting and visibility	Service areas, car parks, lay-bys and possibly trunk & slip roads	Large areas obscured from view or unlit	Few areas where lighting is dim or absent	Well lit, no areas obscured from view
Emergency call facilities	Car parks, lay-bys	Difficult to locate, damaged or non-functional	Reasonable level of service	Well located, easy to identify & in full working order
Pedestrian and cyclist facilities	Bridges and under-passes	Obscured from view, poorly lit	Reasonable features	Well lit, designed for visibility

Source: Department for Transport

Table 8.3: Security Indicators for Walking and Cycling

Security Indicator	Poor	Moderate	High
Route length and facilities	Unmarked or poorly marked paths/cycleway, no signage, etc.	Attention to route marking and signs, but not separated from main vehicular flows.	Clearly marked and signed route, separated from vehicular flows. Rest/secure parking facilities.
Formal surveillance	No CCTV system. Presence of security staff not apparent.	CCTV system in place but number, location not optimal. Passive system monitoring by staff.	Effective CCTV system in place, used for active real-time monitoring.
Informal surveillance	Poor design that hinders observation of public areas by staff.	Neutral characteristics	Design features facilitate staff monitoring.
Landscaping	Landscaping features (slopes, trees etc.) inhibit visibility. For lay-bys, not visible from road.	Generally good, but with a small number of features that conceal areas	Clear sight lines exist to all areas. No concealed areas. For lay-bys, clearly visible from a distance.
Lighting and visibility	Large areas unlit or obscured from view. Poor or no lighting in night . No or poor lighting on any signing, information or help points.	Few areas where lighting is dim or absent	All areas well lit. Attention to lighting on signing, information and help points.
Emergency call facilities	Difficult to locate, damaged or non-functional	Reasonable level of service	Well located, easy to identify & in full working order
Pedestrian and cyclist facilities	Obscured from view, poorly lit	Reasonable features	Well lit, designed for visibility

Using these indicators practitioners should complete Table 8.4 to assess the impact of an option on security. Where the option involves more than one mode, separate versions should be completed. This assesses the level on each security indicator before and after the implementation of the option being appraised.

Table 8.4: Assessment of Security Sub-Criterion

Security Indicator	Relative importance (High/Medium/Low)	Vulnerable groups of society affected	Without strategy (Poor/Moderate/High)	With strategy (Poor/Moderate/High)
Site perimeters, entrances and exits
Formal surveillance
Informal surveillance
Landscaping
Lighting and visibility
Emergency call

Completion of the table should be accompanied by an assessment/details of:

Approximate numbers of users affected;
Overall assessment on security (marginal/moderate/major positive or negative, or neutral);
Reference source(s); and
Qualitative comments.

Where possible there should be a link between the assessment of security related problems and the appraisal of security in the AST. Public consultation can inform the appraisal of security improvements in a similar way as it can inform the identification of problems associated with security of a particular mode (see Section 8.4).

At Part 2 Appraisal, it will be necessary to introduce quantitative measures to the appraisal to complement or even replace qualitative measures. Examples include:

Outputs from surveys designed to capture users' perception of security in different scenarios or assess their preference for different security measures. An example of the latter could include surveys where participants are asked to prioritise security related improvements by allocating a fixed sum of money to different measures;
Quality of service monitors which explicitly capture perception of security at different facilities; and
‘Before' and ‘After' surveys of levels of use of comparative facilities where security enhancing measures have been introduced.

If practitioners are considering deviating from the methodology outlined in the STAG technical database, they should consult with the Scottish Government and/or its agency Transport Scotland through the STAG mailbox or other relevant means or such other funding agency as is appropriate.

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8.3.1 Assessment of Security Sub-Criterion

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